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Dystopia is a peculiar concept. Like dark matter or ‘the market,’ dystopias are
generally difficult to find in the wild even while there are always ‘future dystopias’
looming on the horizon. While many places on earth may already deserve the title –
Congolese cobalt mines, the Gaza Strip, secret Chicago prisons – our interpretation
of dystopia is chiefly one based on temporality. Things are changing, and we fear the
worst will happen. Or, what’s happening is bad, but don’t worry – it gets worse.
The types of futuristic societies envisioned by Reijers and van ‘t Klooster provide
outwardly opposing views. But whether dystopian or not, the ‘social’ of the social
credit system under debate remains largely untroubled. For Reijers, it’s simply
an instrumentalised ‘social order’ within China; for van ‘t Klooster, it’s an ideal
market with potential for just consequences. The social serves as a placeholder for
something more, an unstated premise that hides in plain sight.
In the case of China, the dystopian algorithmic future of this placeholder is seasoned
by Orientalist appreciation. The widely cited Bonaparte quotation ‘China is a sleeping
lion. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world’ locates this futurity
on a terrain of awe-inspired fear. In a 2014 speech in Paris, even Chinese President
Xi Jinping recited the passage, marshalling the implied danger that establishes
China as an imminent, not-to-be-messed-with seismic force to an apprehensive
French audience.
And for the West, with the narrativised help of Black Mirror’s ‘Nosedive’, China’s
Social Credit System supplies the ‘ur text’ of the intersection between technology
and dystopia for our contemporary era. But while social credit systems of any form
are appalling for many reasons, I want to resist relying on a good vs. bad framing
without taking a breath to assess a presupposition. What do all social credit systems
purportedly want; what is the ’social' in social credit? I answer with conventional
wisdom from digital studies, science and technology studies, and critical theory: to
reproduce the social, just as asymmetric, biased, and discriminating as it was when it
was born.
Social, So What?
I am no expert of China. And while I am a professor who writes and teaches on
digital technology and cultural studies, my interest in the issue of China’s Social
Credit System is one that doesn’t necessarily fit the typical Orwellian shade of
authoritarianism. I propose we briefly remove China from our analysis and think
about ‘social credit system’ in the abstract, alleviating some of the more problematic
points of cross-cultural pressure – like racial othering and cultural fetishization
- 1 -
– normally assigned to China by a Western audience. In doing so, I structure
my perspective in an Althusserian form, concerned not only with the power to
make ‘good citizens’, but also the process by which that power is constructed and
maintained.
Abstracting a social credit system allows us to ask more general questions. Most
important: what in the world is the ‘social’? Any social system, credit or not, needs
to reproduce itself. For Althusser, the social conditions of life are reproduced –
just like labour power – through repression and/or ideological interpellation. While
Althusser’s perspective has been long-troubled by scholars, it remains a useful
analytic of the social that refuses a vague, neutral origin story. Rather, the social is
a constantly reorganised definition of community that always exploits some for the
sake of others. Far from Hobbesian or Lockean mythologies of harmonious nation-
building, Althusser’s formulation apprehends empowered difference, i.e., those with
power vs. those without, as its structural a priori.
But social credit systems in general are more intimate than some rudimentary
ideological relation. Reijers explains that such a system ‘extends the notion of a
permanent record tied to a person to a great many kinds of everyday behaviours’, a
tying that combines singular institutions of power (the police, education, the media)
into one agglomerated ideological social factory. This definition of society routes
through the calculations of biopolitics and statistics, scarred and disfigured by the
founding limitations of datafication.
Limits of Datafication
One limitation of datafication: as much as dystopian imaginations tend to
universalise their anxieties onto all aspects of life, there can be no completeness
of surveillance and control. From Chinese Social Credit, to Facebook’s
‘Trustworthiness’ scale, and to even Pinochet’s ‘Directory of Commercial
Information’, all these systems rely on complex, but still incomplete, methods of
deducing an individual’s value to a society. Subjects are not interpreted, as is, but
forced to prefigure their actions based on how they are datafied: smiling at a stranger
won’t raise your score while buying vegetables will.
In this case, civic obligations are configured by the recognised perimeter of
datafication, a street light effect of virtue where civic virtue that is untranslatable
into data gets demoted or ignored. While virtue itself can never be separated from
existing reward structures in society (in the US, ‘I Voted’ stickers, not votes, operate
as the real designation of virtue), an ideal of virtue configured according to data and
its algorithmic outcome pursue a value structure according to what is interpreted to
be measured as virtuous, not what may be socially deemed as virtuous. The social is
reproduced in intermediary, data-based, form.
Another limit of datafication: that social credit systems rely exclusively on data
means subjects are not just seen by power but seen by power through data. The
production and reproduction of the social is how data produces and reproduces
its datafied subjects. Yet instances of datafication are exceedingly social – and I
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do not mean this in a good way. Just like the social reproduces the social, readers
interested in questions of digital technology may be familiar with the fact that
algorithmic processing of data also inevitably reproduces existing biases and
oppressions. Facial recognition systems are notoriously racist and transphobic.
Algorithmic hiring systems redouble sexism. Quantified self-tracking systems further
alienate and dispossess users with disabilities.
Datafication is thus an intensely political process, and that ‘any behaviour that
can be reliably measured is a potential input for a social credit rating’, citing van
‘t Klooster, should worry us. What it means to ‘reliably measure’ is not merely a
question of scientific method as measurement itself can only exist within the realm
of politics. We see this in China. While the persecuted Uyghur ethnic group in the
country’s western Xinjiang region are certainly repressed by security forces, the
Uyghurs – their faces and names – are also studied in ways that may technologically
improve that repression. Just like how the post-9/11 US push to hire more Arabic
translators allowed for increased surveillance and thus measurement of Arab-
speaking populations, measurement is not just using a ruler to assess the length of
an object. It is an intensely political act, an act where to ‘reliably measure’ this social
in unqualified form is, at face value, unjust. If an algorithmic social credit system
might lead to dystopia, I would not really blame the algorithm but the ‘topia’ it comes
from.
Qualifications for the Future
Ironic for an argument of abstraction, I end with an appeal for qualification. Much
like an unqualified ‘citizen’ or ‘civic virtue’ – which strategically positions the rights
and obligations of citizen away from its lived, differential reality, and thus affirms
an ideal that likely will not apply in practice – the qualified examples of the US and
China show us that not all types of people are citizens in the same way. The ideal
of the nation, and the society that grounds that ideal, is itself exclusionary. While
Arab people in the US are formally citizens, their enacted practice of citizenship is
ontologically conditioned through the lens of white supremacy. The same, but in
distinct ways, with China and its Uyghur population. When datafication reproduces
the social, it is precisely this relationship of marginalization that is intentionally and
unintentionally datafied.
We need to both qualify subjects of surveillance and the underlying assumptions
of that surveillance. Neither capitalism nor socialism was discussed in Reijers or
van ‘t Klooster – only an unqualified market – in debates about the efficacy of social
credit systems for enforcing authoritarianism or producing justice. I return to the
origin question: what is the ’social' of social credit? At the end of the day, these
systems are not currently for the demos. The social here is deployed as a source
of information, turned against the demos by forces hegemonically empowered to
maintain ideological control. If there is to be any justice, I would most intently ask:
how do we make these systems about us, a social credit system democratically
operated – not a social credit by a socialist social credit system?
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